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Nagorno-Karabakh – conflict unfreezing
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof Strachota
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh po-
ses the greatest challenge to the security and stability of the Southern Cau-
casus. Although a ceasefire has been in place and a peace process under 
way since 1994, there is growing concern that the threat of the resumption 
of military action is growing. 
Proof of that is provided by, for example, the arms race dictated by Azerba-
ijan and its use of war rhetoric. A major factor, in addition to Azerbaijan’s in-
creasing potential and ambitions, which is destabilising the situation concer-
ning Karabakh seems to be the changing geopolitical situation in this region. 
Although the outbreak of a new war over Nagorno-Karabakh seems unlikely 
(as this would be risky to all the actors involved) within the next year, if the 
current trends continue, this will be difficult to avoid in the future. A further 
increase in the tension, and especially a military conflict (whatever its out-
come), will lead to deep changes in the situation in the Southern Caucasus 
and in the policies of the countries which are active in this region. 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Background
Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Repu-
blic, whose population consisted predominantly of Armenian minority, within the borders set 
by Moscow in 1923. When the USSR was collapsing, the Armenian-Azeri conflict rekindled 
as a further attempt in the 20th century to unite Karabakh and Armenia (1988), which led 
to anti-Armenian massacres and the war over Nagorno-Karabakh (1991–1994). With the 
engagement of Soviet and later Russian forces, which played a key role – initially they fought 
on the side of Azerbaijan only to shift their support to Armenia some time later – the hot 
phase of the conflict ended as Armenians took control over almost the whole of Nagorno- 
-Karabakh and seven regions in Azerbaijan which surround the enclave (‘occupied territo-
ries’), as a consequence of which Nagorno-Karabakh had a border with Armenia and Iran1.
The self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is functioning in Karabakh and the occu-
pied territories and is unrecognised by the international community, including Armenia. Ho-
wever, in practice it has close political, military and economic bonds with Armenia; Yerevan 
also represents Karabakh in peace talks. 
The ceasefire in 1994 and the peace process initiated at that time have been supervised by 
the OSCE Minsk Group chaired by Russia, the USA and France. The main issues discussed 
during the negotiations include: the return of the occupied territories (around Karabakh); 
1 The area of Nagorno- 
-Karabakh is 4,400 km2, 
and with the occupied 
territories it reaches 
approximately 12,000 
km2 (14% of the area 
of Azerbaijan). 
Around 130,000 
Armenians live 
in Karabakh at present. 
Around 600,000 Azeris 
fled from Karabakh 
and the occupied terri-
tories as a consequence 
of the military action. 
Around 400,000 
Armenians left 
Azerbaijan as a result 
of the ethnic conflict. 
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the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh; the rules for the return of refugees; the status 
of the ‘Lachin corridor’ (this provides a connection between Karabakh and Armenia); 
and safety guarantees for the solutions taken (there are no peacekeeping forces in the con-
flict area at present) included in the package of the ‘Madrid rules’ set in 2007. The 17-year 
peace process has not brought about any real changes in the conflict area. 
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is at the same time a frozen Armenian-Azeri ethnic 
conflict of an internal and local nature and also in fact a conflict between two states 
(Azerbaijan and Armenia). It needs to be emphasised that it is the symbolic and historical 
significance of Karabakh for both parties and not its economic potential (natural resources 
or location) which plays the decisive role in this case, since the area cannot be said to have 
any economic potential. Furthermore, the unresolved conflict over Karabakh is one of the 
main causes of instability in the entire Southern Caucasus region and a key tool, especially 
for Russia, in the geopolitical game in the Southern Caucasus. 
The unfreezing conflict 
The relative stability in the conflict area since 1994 has been based on both the sides 
respecting the ceasefire signed then, on the acceptance of the Minsk Group as a mediator 
and on the balance of powers which existed at that time between the two parties (relatively 
equal strength and no sufficient political or military means to break the deadlock) and also 
the geopolitical situation (the dominant position of Russia). 
The ceasefire and the commencement of the talks was a temporarily acceptable but 
obviously a transient situation for both parties. For Azerbaijan, Karabakh is a symbol of 
the lack of territorial sovereignty and a key element for building state and national identi-
ty (as one of the cradles of Azeri culture) 
as well as social consolidation. From Azer-
baijan’s point of view, it is obvious that 
the conflict should be resolved in a way 
which gives it back control of the disputed 
territories. 
Armenians treat Karabakh as one of the 
main historical centres inhabited by Arme-
nians and, moreover, an embodiment of 
the key national idea, the struggle for su-
rvival in the face of the expanding Turkish 
element. The victory in the Karabakh war 
is contemporary Armenia’s greatest suc-
cess, which has built extremely strong bonds with Karabakh; for example, as a consequ-
ence of the Karabakh war veterans assuming power in Yerevan in 1998. Although Armenia 
(unlike Karabakh itself and a significant part of the diaspora) does not rule out the possible 
future formal supremacy of Baku over the disputed territories, it definitely will not agree to 
Azerbaijan’s real control of Karabakh, especially in the area of security. 
In both cases the determination of the elite and nations to have control over Karabakh and 
the distrust of the other party seem to be unshaken. The Minsk Group can do almost nothing 
in this situation. The threat to the status quo is posed not so much by the aggressive rhetoric 
and regular gunfire from both sides, which have been part of the reality there since 1994, but 
the real change in the balance of power between Armenians and Azeris and a deep change 
in the geopolitical context, which has been stabilising the situation thus far. Serious signs of 
these changes appeared in the middle of the past decade and intensified over the past two 
years, which means that the risk of questioning the present situation in constantly growing. 
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The growing disproportion of powers
Armenians are the dominating party in this conflict: they won the war, control the disputed 
territories and occupy the convenient defence positions, and their armed forces are per-
fectly trained and brave (until recently the army of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic had the reputation of being the strongest in the entire Caucasus). Armenians from 
Karabakh form an integral part of Armenia’s security system. In turn, Armenia is a political 
and military ally of Russia, a place where Russian troops are stationed and Moscow’s only 
strong foothold, apart from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in the Southern Caucasus. 
However, it must also be considered that Armenia has a clearly smaller demographic (which 
is constantly being weakened due to emigration) and economic potential than Azerbaijan, 
and its political position in the region is weakening. Nevertheless, Armenia is still a vital 
element in Russia’s regional policy, it can 
influence Russian policy to a minimal 
extent and is treated as an object rather 
than partner in relations with Moscow. 
Armenia, which is isolated by Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, has no other alternative but 
to co-operate with Russia. This depen-
dence has become even stronger as Rus-
sian firms took control over Armenia’s key 
economic assets. The Russian attempt 
to become more entrenched in Armenia 
(2010) showed that Yerevan is increasin-
gly limited: Russia gained permission to 
extend the lease on its military bases until 
2044, reinstated its commitment to defend Armenia but not Karabakh, while continuing 
military co-operation with Azerbaijan. Establishing closer political contacts with the EU has 
brought only minimal benefits to Yerevan, which is due to the lack of foundations for its 
strategic economic co-operation with the West and also to the unsuccessful brave attempt 
at normalising relations with Turkey in 2009–2010. 
Both the deep-rooted mistrust of Azeris and Turks among Armenians and the lengthy crisis 
on the internal political scene (including questioning the position of the ruling class origi-
nating from Karabakh) are making a peaceful compromise solution less likely and thus are 
limiting the room for political manoeuvre available to Yerevan. 
In contrast to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s strength and position are constantly growing. The ce-
asefire of 1994 was the onset for tidying up the political scene and consolidating power in 
the hands of Geidar Aliyev and later his son, Ilham. The Aliyevs’ power is unquestionable as 
part of the present system. The stabilisation enabled the implementation of serious invest-
ments in the oil and gas sectors and the export of these fuels to Europe bypassing Russia. 
State budget revenues have been rapidly increasing since 2005, which has been reflected 
for example in the constantly increasing military budget (Azerbaijan’s military budget has 
grown from US$135 million in 2003 to US$3.12 billion in 2011, which accounts for ap-
proximately 20% of this country’s budget expenses, and is larger than the total state budget 
of Armenia). Azerbaijan has also gained significance in Europe as a supplier of oil and gas. 
The planned launch of the Southern Gas Corridor to the EU will make Azerbaijan a partner 
whose significance is difficult to overestimate. Furthermore, a measurable economic base 
has been created for a political alliance of Baku and Ankara. Azerbaijan has been able to 
make Turkey break off the process of normalising relations with Armenia, and is now hoping 
to force its own preferences upon the EU as regards the shape of the Southern Corridor. 
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The increasing potential, including the diversification of political and economic contacts, 
has made it possible for Azerbaijan to significantly strengthen its position in dealings with 
Russia, which wants to hold hegemony in this region. At present, the only undisputed tool 
Moscow has to apply pressure on Baku is the frozen conflict in Karabakh. 
Azerbaijan is not attempting to conceal that a resolution of the Karabakh conflict is to be 
a tangible crowning achievement of the increase in its position and potential (which Baku 
seems to be convinced of); the optimal scenario being a peaceful resolution with the invo-
lvement of external players. However, it should be borne in mind that the scenario of rega-
ining Karabakh by military means, were the peace process to be unsuccessful or last too 
long, is becoming more likely in Baku. In comparison to Azerbaijan, Armenia is seen more 
and more obviously as a weaker player with no strategic initiative.
Russia’s position in the region changes
Since the collapse of the USSR, each military conflict in the Southern Caucasus has erup-
ted, continued and become frozen with the active and decisive participation of Russia. 
Domination in the area of security is the main pillar of Moscow’s policy in this region, which 
no one has been able to successfully contest. The Karabakh conflict was also developing 
under dictation from Russia, and when it froze it offered Russia the strongest position 
as a mediator within the Minsk Group (Russia is the main host of the meetings, forces the 
agenda upon the other group members, etc.)2. Furthermore, Moscow as Yerevan’s ally and 
the strongest political and military player in the region has a tangible influence on the way 
the situation around Karabakh develops. This was confirmed during the conflict with Geor-
gia in 2008: Moscow will not accept any unilateral changes in the conflict areas and in the 
area of security in the Southern Caucasus (and even less so those supported by its geopo-
litical rivals), and is ready to resort to military measures to defend its interests. Azerbaijan 
understood this message perfectly because it significantly softened its warlike rhetoric for 
almost one year starting in August 2008. 
The guidelines of the Russian policy in the Southern Caucasus have turned out to be very 
successful as regards Armenia (aggravating political and economic incapacitation). Mean-
while, Azerbaijan has been consistently getting out of the control this policy is intended to 
impose. The erosion of the recent political 
domination in this region is also deepe-
ning at the expense of geopolitical rivals. 
Despite the frozen conflict in Karabakh, 
Azerbaijan has become economically in-
dependent of Russia and has strongly in-
creased its political significance capitali-
sing on energy projects (the development 
of oil and gas field and transit routes), which fundamentally contradicts Russian interests. 
In the present situation, a further development of the infrastructure (the Southern Gas 
Corridor, especially its variant which envisages the construction of the Nabucco and the 
Trans-Caspian gas pipeline instead of using the existing infrastructure) would mean another 
strategic defeat to Russia in this region, the complete independence of Azerbaijan and lo-
sing ground to Turkey and Europe. 
The frozen conflict in Karabakh is fulfilling Russia’s hopes to control Azerbaijan only to 
a limited extent but it is still the most powerful tool Moscow has. If one assumes that Russia 
will not relinquish its domination in the Southern Caucasus, it is likely to actively participate 
in each attempt to change the status quo in Karabakh, if any is made. It cannot be ruled 
out that it will feel forced to initiate changes beneficial for itself, should it deem Karabakh 
no longer an effective political tool and that time is playing to its disadvantage.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The meeting of the presidents 
of Azerbaijan and Armenia 
in March 2011 with the chair-
men of the OSCE Minsk Group 
at the airport in Sochi after 
they had had trilateral talks for 
a few hours with the president 
of Russia, Dmitri Medvedev 
were symptomatic.
The frozen conflict in Karabakh 
is fulfilling Russia’s hopes 
to control Azerbaijan only 
to a limited extent but it is still 
the most powerful tool Moscow has.
i s s u e  6 5  |  2 6 . 1 0 . 2 0 1 1  |  c e N T R e  f O R  e A s T e R N  s T u d i e s
cOMMeNTARyOsw
OSW.WAW.PL 5
Changes in the geopolitical situation in the region
The balance of power in the early 1990s caused Turkey, the USA and the EU, despite 
their growing ambitions and interests, to be forced to accept Russia’s political and military 
domination in the Southern Caucasus. Open attempts to undermine the dominant position 
of Russia have been either avoided or unsuccessful. An extreme example was the failure of 
Georgia’s integration with NATO (the war of 2008), and to a lesser extent, Turkey’s attempts 
to mediate the Karabakh process and to be present in this region through the Caucasus 
Stability and Cooperation Platform in 2008, or the unsuccessful attempt of ‘disarming’ 
the Karabakh conflict by normalising Turkish-Armenian relations in 2008–2009. 
However, what have proven very success-
ful are long-term actions (especially sup-
port for reforms in Georgia after 2003; 
the cautious but also comprehensive EU 
Neighbourhood Policy also has great po-
tential) but in the first order activity in the 
field of energy: the exploration of oil and 
gas fields, the construction of oil and gas 
transport routes from Azerbaijan through 
Georgia and Turkey to Europe. This seems 
to be the factor which decides on the 
growth of Azerbaijan’s potential and am-
bitions and at the same time is upsetting 
the domination of Russia and the relative balance of power around Karabakh. Moreover, 
this is also a factor which determines the tangible and strategic economic interests of Euro-
pean corporations, the EU and Turkey most of all. 
The security and stability of this region, and especially Azerbaijan (which is directly linked 
to Karabakh) are the conditions which need to be met in order for the economic and politi-
cal interests of external partners to be implemented. The status quo regarding Karabakh 
has enabled the implementation of the basic economic interests (and to a lesser extent, 
political) but it does not give such guarantees for the future (the lack of direct and decisive 
impact on the parties to this conflict and the peace process). The degree of internationali-
sation of this conflict does not fit in with the political framework in which it is functioning. 
Given the scale of the interests, it seems unlikely that Turkey and the West will remain 
passive if an attempt at upsetting the status quo around the conflict by any of the parties 
is made. In the longer term, the problem will be aggravating.
Possible developments: war or peace? 
The changes which have been taking place in the Southern Caucasus since 1994, espe-
cially the changes in the balance of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the change 
of the geopolitical situation in the region are causing the model of freezing the Karabakh 
conflict to fit in less and less with reality and to guarantee a diminishing level of stability. 
The most likely scenario in the short-term, i.e. within one year, will be the preservation 
of the status quo based on the negotiation formula used so far. This variant temporarily 
secures the key current interests and ensures all players room for manoeuvre. Therefore, 
a major breakthrough in the peace talks seems unlikely: attempts at activating the process 
initiated by Russia ended up in failure over the past few months; the presidential election 
in Russia and parliamentary election in Armenia have been scheduled for the first half of 
2012, which is not contributing to external activity and impairs the will for compromise; 
The security and stability of this region 
and especially Azerbaijan are the condi-
tions which need to be met in order for 
the economic and political interests of 
external partners to be implemented. 
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the USA, the EU and Turkey are focused on their internal situation and on problems in 
other parts of the world. Although France has been strongly declaring its will to accelerate 
the peace process (which seems to fit in with both France’s active international policy and 
the electoral campaign of President Nicolas Sarkozy), still Paris is unlikely to have sufficient 
political potential to make any real progress in the negotiations, especially given Azerbai-
jan’s distrust and tense relations with Turkey.
In this context, a breakthrough in the negotiations, and especially a quick signing of peace 
accords, appears even less likely. A far-reaching compromise, which neither of the parties 
(including external players) seem ready to make now, or the creation of a guarantee of se-
curity for this region (the parties are unlikely to accept either an exclusive Russian domina-
tion or the co-option of other reliable guarantors acceptable to the both sides of the conflict 
and Russia) are among the conditions which would need to be assumed with this variant. 
A peace accord finalising the conflict 
in Karabakh seems possible should there 
be a radical change in Karabakh itself 
(especially war) or of a clear change in the 
geopolitical situation. 
Maintaining the present trend of an in-
creasing imbalance between Azerbaijan 
and the Armenians, the lack of progress 
in peace talks and the progressing change 
in the geopolitical context all add up to 
the likelihood of an outbreak of military 
conflict in the longer term. Given the present balance of powers, war is an extremely risky 
variant for both Armenia (preventive war) and Azerbaijan (it is difficult to estimate the real 
degree of Azerbaijan’s military superiority); a lost war poses the risk of internal breakdown 
and loss of what has been achieved so far. Baku’s rational decision to go to war should 
be based on a guarantee of Russia’s friendly neutrality (to be compensated to Moscow 
with strategic concessions in the energy and military sectors which will recoup its ‘loss’ of 
the Armenian card it has been playing thus far), which seems unlikely, given the distrust 
between the parties. However, an uncontrolled (provoked) and limited increase in tension 
in the conflict cannot be ruled out and this would result in the active participation of Russia 
as a mediator. The threat that Baku will decide to launch large-scale military actions will 
be increasing within the next few years (especially if Turkey’s significance grows and Rus-
sia becomes weaker in this region). A possible armed conflict would mean not only serious 
political changes in the entire Southern Caucasus but also would force Russia, Turkey, Iran 
and the Western countries to seriously revise their respective policies. 
Maintaining the present trend 
of an increasing imbalance between 
Azerbaijan and the Armenians, 
the lack of progress in peace talks 
and the progressing change 
in the geopolitical context all add up 
to the likelihood of an outbreak 
of military conflict in the longer term. 
